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Abstract: Let us consider a sequence of formulas providing partial information about an initial
situation, about a set of events occurring sequentially in this situation, and about the resulting
situation after the occurrence of each event. From this whole sequence, we want to infer more
information, either about the initial situation, or about one of the events, or about the resulting
situation after one of the events. Within the framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), we
show that these different kinds of problems are all reducible to the problem of inferring what holds
in the final situation after the occurrence of all the events. We then provide a tableau method
deciding whether this kind of inference is valid. We implement it in LotrecScheme and show that
these inference problems are NEXPTIME-complete. We extend our results to the cases where the
accessibility relation is serial and reflexive and illustrate them with the coordinated attack problem.
Key-words: Dynamic epistemic logic, tableau method, computational complexity
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DEL-séquents généralisés
Résumé : Considérons une séquence de formules fournissant une information partielle à
propos d’une situation initiale, d’un ensemble d’évènements se produisant séquentiellement dans
cette situation, et de la situation résultante après l’occurence de chaque évènement. De cette
séquence, nous voulons déduire plus d’information, soit sur la situation initiale, soit sur l’un des
évènements, soit sur la situation résultante après l’un des évènements. Dans le cadre de la logique
épistémique dynamique (DEL), nous montrons que ces diffŕentes sortes de problèmes sont tous
réductibles au problème de déduire des propriétés de la situation finale après l’occurrence de tous
les évèvenements. Nous fournissons ensuite une méthode tableau qui décide la validité de ce type
d’inférence. Nous l’implémentons en LotrecScheme et prouvons que ces problèmes d’inférence
sont NEXPTIME-complets. Nous étendons nos résultats aux cas où la relation d’accessibilité
est sériale ou réflexive et les illustrons par le problème de l’attaque coordinée.
Mots-clés : Logique épistémique dynamique, méthode tableau, complexité calculatoire
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1 Introduction
Assume that a sequence of n events has occured in a situation. We have some information about
each event and about the resulting situation after the occurrence of each event, in the form of a
sequence of formulas ϕ′i and ϕi respectively:
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
i, ϕi, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn
Our aim is to infer some more information about one of the events or about one of the resulting
situations from the rest of information provided by this sequence. This defines respectively two
different kinds of inference problems.
In the first kind of inference problem, we want to infer more information about the ith
resulting situation. That is, given a formula ψ describing (incompletely) a situation, we want
to verify whether or not we can infer that this property ψ necessarily held at the ith resulting
situation:
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn i
1
ψ ?
In the second kind of inference problem, we want to infer more information about the ith
event. That is, given a formula ψ′ describing (incompletely) this event, we want to verify whether
or not we can infer that this property ψ′ necessarily held during the occurrence of the ith event:
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn i
2
ψ ?
Solving these problems is relevant for dynamic diagnosis for instance (see [10] for an early
survey of dynamic diagnosis). In this field, one is interested in looking for and verifying that plau-
sible diagnoses of a faulty system ‘fit’ a given history that contains some abnormal behaviours.
A diagnosis is a series of faults together with the time when they occur. Within our setting, this
verification problem amounts to deciding about the satisfiability of a sequence of formulas.
We moreover assume that our situations involve several agents and we are interested in
reasoning about the beliefs and knowledge of these agents. Our formulas ϕ′i and ϕi will therefore
express beliefs of several agents about events and about the resulting situations. For these
reasons, we address our two problems above within the framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL for short), since this logical framework is very well suited to express and reason about the
beliefs of several agents in a dynamic setting.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall the core of dynamic epistemic
logic and define our two kinds of inference problems. We show that these two kinds of inference
problems are actually both reducible to the problem of inferring what holds in the final situation
after the occurrence of all the events from the rest of the sequence. In Section 3, we provide
a terminating, sound and complete tableau method that decides whether this kind of inference
is valid. In Section 4, we show that our tableau method is optimal, first by proving that it
is in NEXPTIME, and then by proving that our inference problem is NEXPTIME-hard. We
also provide in this section a link to an implementation of our tableau method in LotrecScheme
together with some details about its implementation. In Section 5, we extend our results to richer
semantics where the accessibility relations are reflexive and serial. In Section 6, we apply our
generalized DEL-sequents to the coordinated attack problem of the distributed system literature.
Finally, in Section 7, we discuss some related work, and then conclude.
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic: DEL-sequents
Following the methodology of DEL, we split the exposition of the logical framework into three
subsections. We then define our generalized DEL-sequents in Section 2.4.
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2.1 Representation of the initial situation: L-model
In the rest of this paper, Φ is a countably infinite set of propositional letters called atomic facts
which describe static situations, and Agt is a finite set of agents.
An L-model is a tuple M = (W,R, V ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
• R : Agt→ 2W×W is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ Agt an accessibility relation on
W ,
• V : Φ → 2W is a function assigning to each propositional letter of Φ a subset of W . The
function V is called a valuation.
We write w ∈ M for w ∈ W , and (M, w) is called a pointed L-model (w often represents the
actual world). If w, v ∈ W , we write wRav for R(a)(w, v) and Ra(w) = {v ∈ W | wRav}.
Intuitively, wRav means that in world w agent a considers that world v might be the actual
world.
Then, we define the following epistemic language L that can be used to describe and state
properties of L-models:
L : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Baϕ
where p ranges over Φ and a over Agt. We define ϕ ∨ ψ
def
= ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and 〈Ba〉ϕ
def
= ¬Ba¬ϕ.
The symbol > is an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p for a chosen p ∈ Φ. Let M be an L-model, w ∈ M
and ϕ ∈ L. M, w |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= Baϕ iff for all v ∈ Ra(w), M, v |= ϕ
The formula Baϕ reads as “agent a believes ϕ”. Its truth conditions are defined in such a
way that agent a believes ϕ holds in a possible world when ϕ holds in all the worlds agent a
considers possible. Dually, the formula 〈Ba〉ϕ reads as “agent a considers ϕ is plausible”. Agent
a considers that ϕ is plausible in a possible world when ϕ holds in at least one of the worlds
agent a considers possible.
2.2 Representation of the event: L′-model
The propositional letters p′ describing events are called atomic events and range over an infinite
set Φ′. To each atomic event p′, we assign a formula of the language L, which is called the
precondition of p′. This precondition corresponds to the property that should be true in any
world w of an L-model so that the atomic event p′ can ‘physically’ occur in this world w. To
do so we define a surjection Pre : Φ′ → L that is called the precondition function. We take it
surjective so that we have an atomic event for every possible precondition.
An L′-model is a tuple M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) where:
• W ′ is a non-empty set of possible events,
• R′ : Agt → 2W
′×W ′ is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ Agt an accessibility relation
on W ′,
Inria
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• V ′ : Φ′ → 2W
′
is a function assigning to each propositional letter of Φ′ a subset of W ′ such
that for all w′ ∈W ′, there is at most one p′ such that w′ ∈ V ′(p′) (Exclusivity).
We write w′ ∈ M′ for w′ ∈ W ′, and (M′, w′) is called a pointed L′-model and w′ represents
the actual event of (M′, w′). If w′, u′ ∈ W ′, we write w′R′au
′ for R′(a)(w′, u′) and R′a(w
′) =
{u′ ∈W ′ | w′R′au
′}. Intuitively, u′ ∈ R′a(w
′) means that while the possible event represented by
w′ is occurring, agent a considers possible that the possible event represented by u′ is actually
occurring. Our definition of an L′-model is equivalent to the definition of an action signature in
the logical framework of [6].1
Just as we defined a language L for L-models, we also define a language L′ for L′-models (L′
was already introduced in [8]):
L′ : ϕ′ ::= p′ | ¬ϕ′ | ϕ′ ∧ ϕ′ | Baϕ′
where p′ ranges over Φ′ and a over Agt. In the sequel, formulas of L′ are always indexed by the
quotation mark ′, unlike formulas of L. The truth conditions of the language L′ are identical
to the ones of the language L. Let M′ be an L′-model, w′ ∈ M′ and ϕ′ ∈ L′. M′, w′ |= ϕ′ is
defined inductively as follows:
M′, w′ |= p′ iff w′ ∈ V ′(p′)
M′, w′ |= ¬ϕ′ iff not M′, w′ |= ϕ′
M′, w′ |= ϕ′ ∧ ψ′ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ′ and M′, w′ |= ψ′
M′, w′ |= Baϕ′ iff for all u′ ∈ R′a(w
′), M′, u′ |= ϕ′
2.3 Update of the initial situation by the event: product update
The precondition function Pre of the previous section induces a precondition function for L′-
models, which assigns to each possible event w′ of an L′-model a formula Pre(w′) of L. The
precondition function induced by the L′-modelM′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) is defined as follows: Pre(w′) =
Pre(p′) if there is p′ such that M′, w′ |= p′; Pre(w′) = > otherwise.
We then redefine equivalently in our setting the BMS product update of [7] as follows. Let
(M, w) = (W,R, V, w) be a pointed L-model and let (M′, w′) = (W ′, R′, V ′, w′) be a pointed
L′-model such that M, w |= Pre(w′). The product update of (M, w) and (M′, w′) is the pointed
L-model (M, w)⊗ (M′, w′) = (W⊗, R⊗, V ⊗, (w,w′)) defined as follows:
W⊗ = {(u, u′) ∈ W ×W ′ | M, u |= Pre(u′)},
R⊗a (u, u
′) = {(v, v′) ∈W⊗ | v ∈ Ra(u) and v
′ ∈ R′a(u
′)},
V ⊗(p) = {(u, u′) ∈ W⊗ | M, u |= p}.
This product update yields a new L-model (M, w)⊗(M′, w′) representing how the new situation
which was previously represented by (M, w) is perceived by the agents after the occurrence of
the event represented by (M′, w′).
2.4 Generalized DEL-sequents
In this section we define two different inference relations on formulas of L and L′ representing
an initial situation, a series of events and resulting epistemic situations. One relation enables to
infer information about one of the epistemic situations, the other about one of the events:
1Let Σ = (W ′, R′, (w′
1
, . . . , w′n)) be an action signature and let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ L. The L
′
-model associated to
(Σ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is the tuple M ′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) where the valuation V ′ is defined as follows. We pick q′ ∈ Φ′ such
that Pre(q′) = >, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we pick p′
i
∈ Φ′ such that Pre(p′
i
) = ϕi. Then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
we set V ′(p′
i
) = {w′
i
}, we also set V ′(q′) = W ′ − {w′
1
, . . . , w′
n
}, and for all p′ ∈ Φ′ − {q′, p′
1
, . . . , p′
n
} we set
V ′(p′) = ∅.
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Definition 1 Let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ψ
′ ∈ L′. We define the logical consequence
relations ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
1
ψ where 0 ≤ k ≤ n, and ϕ0, ϕ′1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
2
ψ′ where
1 ≤ k ≤ n. In the following i ranges over {0, . . . , n} and j ranges over {1, . . . , n}.
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
1
ψ if
for all pointed L-models (M0, w0) and L′-models (M′j , w
′
j), if we have for all i that (Mi, wi) =
(M0, w0)⊗(M′1, w
′
1)⊗. . .⊗(M
′
i, w
′
i) is defined
2 andMi, wi |= ϕi, and for all j thatM′j, w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j,
then Mk, wk |= ψk.
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
2
ψ′ if
for all pointed L-models (M0, w0) and L′-models (M′j , w
′
j), if we have for all i that (Mi, wi) =
(M0, w0)⊗(M
′
1, w
′
1)⊗. . .⊗(M
′
i, w
′
i) is defined andMi, wi |= ϕi, and for all j thatM
′
j, w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j,
then M′k, w
′
k |= ψ
′
k.
In fact, those two DEL-sequent relations are interdefinable:
Proposition 1 For all ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ∈ L, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ψ
′ ∈ L′ and k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
2
ψ′ iff ϕ0, . . . , ϕ
′
k ∧ ¬ψ
′,>, ϕ′k+1, . . . , ϕn k
1 ¬ϕ
Proof i ranges over {0, . . . , n} and j ranges over {1, . . . , n}.
Suppose that ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
2
ψ′ holds and let (M0, w0) be a pointed L-model and
(M′j , w
′
j) be n pointed L
′-models. Assume that for all i, Mi, wi is defined and for all i 6= k,
Mi, wi |= ϕi, for all j 6= k, M′j, w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j , and M
′
k, w
′
k |= ϕ
′
k ∧ ¬ψ
′. Assume towards a
contradiction that Mk, wk |= ϕk. Then, since ϕ0, ϕ′1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
2
ψ′ holds we have that
M′k, w
′
k |= ψ
′. This is a contradiction, so Mk, wk |= ϕk.
Now suppose that ϕ0, . . . , ϕ
′
k ∧ ¬ψ
′,>, ϕ′k+1, . . . , ϕn k
1
¬ϕk holds and let (M0, w0) be a
pointed L-model and (M′j , w
′
j) be n pointed L
′-models. Assume that for all i, Mi, wi is defined
andMi, wi |= ϕi, and assume that for all j, M′j , w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j . Assume towards a contradiction that
M′k, w
′
k 6|= ψ
′. Then M′k, w
′
k |= ¬ψ
′, and because ϕ0, . . . , ϕ
′
k ∧¬ψ
′,>, ϕ′k+1, . . . , ϕn k
1
¬ϕk holds
we have that Mk, wk |= ¬ϕk, which is a contradiction.
Moreover, the first relation can always be reduced to the case where information is inferred
about the last situation:
Proposition 2 For all ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ∈ L, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n ∈ L
′, k < n and ψ ∈ L,
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn k
1
ψ iff ϕ0, . . . , ϕk ∧ ¬ψ, . . . , ϕ
′
n,> n
1
¬ϕn
Considering Propositions 1 and 2, in the rest of the paper we will only provide a tableau
method for the DEL-sequent ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn n
1
ψ.
In [3], we defined three kinds of logical consequence relations dealing with a single event,
which are special cases of the general relations defined here. Let ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ L and ϕ′ ∈ L′. It holds
that:
ϕ0, ϕ
′ ϕ1 iff ϕ0, ϕ
′,>
1
1
ϕ1 ϕ
′, ϕ1
3
ϕ0 iff >, ϕ
′, ϕ1 0
1
ϕ0
ϕ0, ϕ1
2
ϕ′ iff ϕ0,>, ϕ1 1
2
ϕ′
2When i = 0 we let (M0, w0)⊗ (M′1, w
′
1
)⊗ . . .⊗ (M′
i
, w′
i
) = (M0, w0).
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3 Tableau method
We consider 2n+ 2 formulas, ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L and ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n ∈ L
′, and by P ⊂ Φ′ we denote
the finite set of all atomic events appearing in one of the event formulas ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n. i ranges over
{0, . . . , n} and j ranges over {1, . . . , n}. We want to address the problem of deciding whether
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn n
1
ψ holds. To do so we equivalently decide whether this does not hold, i.e
whether there exist a pointed L-model (M0, w0) and n pointed L
′-models (M′j , w
′
j) such that
for all i, (Mi, wi) = (M0, w0)⊗ (M′1, w
′
1)⊗ . . .⊗ (M
′
i, w
′
i) is defined and Mi, wi |= ϕi, for all j
M′j , w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j , and Mn, wn |= ¬ψ. In other terms, deciding whether ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn n
1
ψ
holds reduces to the following problem called the satisfiability problem:
• Input: ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n ∈ L
′ and Pre|P , the restriction of Pre to the domain
P .
• Output: yes iff there exist a pointed L-model (M0, w0) and n pointed L′-models (M′j , w
′
j)
such that for all j,M′j , w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j , for all i, (Mi, wi) = (M0, w0)⊗(M
′
1, w
′
1)⊗ . . .⊗(M
′
i, w
′
i)
is defined and Mi, wi |= ϕi, and Mn, wn |= ψ.
In the rest of the paper, when the initial pointed model (M0, w0) and the pointed event
models (M′i, w
′
i) are clear from the context, we shall write Mi for M0⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i and wi
for (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i).
3.1 Tableau method description
Let Lab be a countable set of labels designed to represent worlds of the initial epistemic model.
For all integers i, let Labi be a countable set of labels designed to represent events of the i
th
event model. We suppose that Lab and Labi for all i are disjoint.
Our tableau method manipulates terms that we call tableau terms and they are of the following
kind:
• (σ ϕ) means that M0, w0 |= ϕ, where w0 is the world of the initial epistemic model M0
represented by σ and ϕ is a formula of L;
• (σi ϕ
′)means thatM′i, w
′
i |= ϕ
′, where w′i is the event of the i
th event modelM′i represented
by σi, and ϕ
′ is a formula of L′;
• (σ σ1 . . . σi ϕ) means that Mi, (w0, w′1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ, where w0 is the world of M0 repre-
sented by σ, w′k ∈M
′
k is the event represented by σk, and ϕ is a formula of L;
• (σ σ1 . . . σi 0) means that (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) is not in Mi, where w0 is the world of M0
represented by σ and w′k ∈ M
′
k is the event represented by σk;
• (Ra σ σ
′) means that the worlds w and u of M0 represented respectively by σ and σ′ are
such that wRau;
• (Ria σi σ
′
i) means that in M
′
i, the events w
′ and u′ represented by σi and σ
′
i are such that
w′R′
i
au
′;
• ⊥ denotes an inconsistency.
We also use generic labels Σ to simplify notations: Σ can be either σ, σi or σ σ1 . . . σi.
(Ra Σ Σ
′) is interpreted in the following way: if Σ = σ, Σ′ = σ′ then (Ra Σ Σ
′) denotes
(Ra σ σ
′), if Σ = σi, Σ
′ = σ′i then (Ra Σ Σ
′) denotes (Ria σi σ
′
i), and if Σ = σ σ1 . . . σi,
Σ′ = σ′ σ′1 . . . σ
′
i then (Ra Σ Σ
′) denotes (Ra σ σ
′)(R1a σ1 σ1) . . . (R
i
a σi σi).
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A tableau rule is represented by a numerator N above a line and a finite list of denominators
D1, . . . ,Dk below this line, separated by vertical bars:
N
D1 | . . . | Dk
The numerator and the denominators are finite sets of tableau terms.
A tableau for a tuple (ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ϕ
′
1, . . . , ϕ
′
n) of formulas is a finite
tree with a set of tableau terms at each node. The root is Γ0 =
{(σ ϕ0), (σ σ1 ϕ1), . . . , (σ σ1 . . . σn ϕn), (σ1 ϕ′1), . . . , (σn ϕ
′
n)}∪ {(σ1 p
′+
1 ), . . . , (σn p
′+
n )},
where p′+1 , . . . , p
′+
n are fresh new atomic events. Indeed, in our tableau method, when a new
event label σi is added to the set Γ of a node, it is assigned a fresh new atomic event p
′+. By
fresh we mean that they do not appear in any event formula ϕ′ in Γ, and their precondition is
also a fresh new atomic proposition that appears neither in any formula nor in any precondition
of any atomic event p′ of Γ. We denote it by Pre(p′+) = p+. We abuse notations by writing
p′ ∈ Γ whenever p′ occurs in a formula appearing in a tableau term in Γ. Those additional fresh
atomic propositions and events are used in the tableau method to avoid the problematic case of
events being built with trivial precondition.
A rule with numerator N is applicable to a node carrying a set Γ if Γ contains an instance of
N . If no rule is applicable, Γ is said to be saturated. We call a node n an end node if the set of
formulas Γ it carries is saturated, or if ⊥∈ Γ. The tableau is extended as follows:
1. Choose a leaf node n carrying Γ where n is not an end node, and choose a rule ρ applicable
to n.
2. (a) If ρ has only one denominator, add the appropriate instanciation to Γ.
(b) If ρ has k denominators with k > 1, create k successor nodes for n, where each
successor i carries the union of Γ with an appropriate instanciation of denominator
Di.
A branch in a tableau is a path from the root to an end node. A branch is closed if its end
node contains ⊥, otherwise it is open. A tableau is closed if all its branches are closed, otherwise
it is open. We write ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn
1 ψ if there is a closed tableau for (ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1, ϕn∧
¬ψ, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n).
3.2 Tableau rules
• Common rules for epistemic formulas and event formulas:
(Σ ϕ ∧ ψ)
(Σ ϕ) (Σ ψ)
∧
(Σ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(Σ ¬ϕ) | (Σ ¬ψ)
¬∧
(Σ ¬¬ϕ)
(Σ ϕ)
¬
(Σ p)(Σ ¬p)
⊥
⊥
(Σ 〈Ba〉ϕ)
(Ra Σ Σ
+)(Σ+ ϕ)(σ+1 p
′+
1 ) . . . (σ
+
i p
′+
i )
〈Ba〉
(Σ Baϕ)(Ra Σ Σ
′)
(Σ′ ϕ) | (Σ′ 0)
Ba
where p is in Φ∪Φ′, σ+1 . . . σ
+
i are the σ
+
k in the fresh generic label Σ
+ (none if Σ+ = σ+)
and p′+k are fresh new atomic events with Pre(p
′+
i ) = p
+
i .
• Specific rule for event formulas:
Inria
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(σi p
′)(σi p
′′)
⊥
Excl
where p′, p′′ are not fresh (p′, p′′ ∈ Γ0) and p′ 6= p′′.
• Specific rules for epistemic formulas:
(σ σ1 . . . σi p)
(σ p)
←1
(σ σ1 . . . σi ¬p)
(σ ¬p)
←2
(σ 0)
⊥
Pre0
(σ σ1 . . . σi ϕ)(σi p
′)
(σ σ1 . . . σi−1 Pre(p
′))
Pre1
ϕ 6= 0, i > 0
(σ σ1 . . . σi 0)(σi p
′)
(σ σ1 . . . σi−1 ¬Pre(p
′)) | (σ σ1 . . . σi−1 0)
Pre2
i > 0
We explain informally the meaning of these rules. The boolean rules, rule 〈Ba〉 and rule Ba
are classic. Rule Excl enforces the Exclusivity of event models. It does not apply to the fresh
atomic events that we add at the creation of each event label, because a “meaningful” atomic
event may be added to such a label; however these fresh events are removed from the final
constructed models unless they are the only atomic event in their possible event. Rules ←1 and
←2 reflect the fact that for a world (w0, w′1, . . . , w
′
i) in Mi, by definition of the update product,
Mi, (w0, w′1, . . . , w
′
i) |= p if, and only if, M0, w0 |= p. Rule Pre1 says that if (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i)
is in Mi and M′i, w
′
i |= p
′, then (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1) is in Mi−1 and Mi−1, (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1)
verifies Pre(p′). Rule Pre2 says that if (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) is not in Mi and M
′
i, w
′
i |= p
′, either
(w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1) is not in Mi−1, or it is in Mi−1 but Mi−1, (w0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1) 6|= Pre(p
′).
Finally, Rule Pre0 is used to forbid the rightmost choice in Rule Pre2 when i = 1. Indeed it
would make no sense to say that the world associated to a label σ must not be in the initial
model M0 when it has been created to be in M0.
Proposition 3 (Tableau method soundness) For all ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L, for all ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n ∈
L′, ϕ0, ϕ′1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn
1 ψ implies ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn n
1
ψ.
Proof We prove it by contrapositive. Suppose that there exist a pointed L-model (M0, w0), and
n L′-models (M′j , w
′
j) such that for all i,Mi, wi is defined andMi, wi |= ϕi, for all j,M
′
j , w
′
j |=
ϕ′j and Mn, wn 6|= ψ. We must prove that every tableau for (ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1, ϕn ∧ ¬ψ, ϕ
′
1, . . . , ϕ
′
n)
has an open branch (the proof of termination is in the proof of Lemma 8).
We say that a set Σ of tableau terms is interpretable with respect to a subset of relevent
atomic events S′ if there exists an L-modelM0, n L
′-modelsM′i, partial functions ν : Lab→W
and νi : Labi → W ′i (where i ranges over {1 . . . , n}) defined exactly on labels that appear in Σ
such that (M, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) makes all the tableau terms in Σ true for the following
semantics |=T :
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ ϕ) iff M, ν(σ) |= ϕ
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σi ϕ
′) iff ϕ′ = p′ for some p′ /∈ S′ or
M′i, νi(σi) |= ϕ
′
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (Ra σ σ
′) iff ν(σ)Raν(σ
′)
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (R
′i
a σi σ
′
i) iff νi(σi)R
′i
aνi(σ
′
i)
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(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi 0)
iff (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)) /∈Mi
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi ϕi)
iff
wi ∈ Mi, where wi = (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)), and Mi, wi |= ϕi
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T⊥ iff false
Since ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn 6 n
1
ψ, the set Γ0 = {(σ ϕ0), (σ σ1 ϕ1), . . . , (σ σ1 . . . σn−1 ϕn−1)}
∪{(σ σ1 . . . σn ϕn∧¬ψ), (σ1 ϕ′1), . . . , (σn ϕ
′
n), (σ1 p
′+
1 ), . . . , (σn p
′+
n )} is interpretable. Moreover,
if a set of formulas is interpretable, it does not contain ⊥. So if we prove that when the numerator
of a rule is interpretable, one of the denominators also is, then we have that every tableau for
(ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1,¬ϕn, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n) has an open branch. We only prove it for Excl, 〈Ba〉 and Ba
when Σ = σ σ1 . . . σi, and the specific rules for epistemic formulas, the proof for the other rules
being standard. In the following, when ν is a function, we let ν(x 7→ a) be the function that
maps x to a and y to ν(y) if y 6= x.
Rule 〈Ba〉: If (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi 〈Ba〉ϕ) then, if wi =
(ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)), then Mi, wi |= 〈Ba〉ϕ. So there exists ui = (u, u′1, . . . , u
′
i) ∈ Wi
such that wiR
i
aui and Mi, ui |= ϕ. Since wR
i
au we have that ν(σ)Rau, νj(σj)R
j
au
′
j for all
j ≤ i. So by letting ν′ := ν(σ+ 7→ u), ν′j := νj(σ
+
j 7→ u
′
j), and M
′′
j being the same as M
′
j
except that its valuation maps p′+j to {u
′
j}, we have that (M0, (M
′′
i )1≤i≤n, ν
′, (ν′i)1≤i≤n) |=T
{(Ra σ σ
+)(R1a σ1 σ
+
1 ) . . . (R
i
a σi σ
+
i )(σ
+ σ+1 . . . σ
+
i ϕ)(σ
+
1 p
′+
1 ) . . . (σ
+
i p
′+
i )}.
Rule Ba:
If (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T {(σ σ1 . . . σi Baϕ)(Ra σ σ
′)(R1a σi σ
′
i) . . . (R
i
a σi σ
′
i)},
then, noting wi = (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)), wi ∈ Mi, (Mi, wi) |= Baϕ, ν(σ)Raν(σ′) and
νi(σj)R
j
aνj(σ
′
j) for all j ≤ i. Note ui = (ν(σ
′), ν1(σ
′
1), . . . , νi(σ
′
i)). Either ui /∈ Mi, and
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ
′ σ′1 . . . σ
′
i 0), or ui ∈ Mi, and by definition of R
i
a we
have that wiR
i
aui, hence Mi, ui |= ϕ and we conclude that (M0, (M
′
i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T
(σ′ σ′1 . . . σ
′
i ϕ).
Rules ←1 and ←2: If (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi p) then , noting wi =
(ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)), wi ∈ Mi and (Mi, wi) |= p. Since V (ν(σ)) = V
i(wi) by definition of
the product, M0, ν(σ) |= p hence (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ p). The case of rule ←2
is proved similarly.
Rules Pre1 and Pre2:
Suppose (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T {(σ σ1 . . . σi ϕi)(σi p
′)} for some ϕ 6= 0
and note wi = (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi)) and wi−1 = (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi−1(σi−1)). Then
wi ∈ Mi and M′i, νi(σi) |= p
′. Since wi ∈ Mi, we have that Mi−1, wi−1 |=
Pre(p′). So (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi−1 Pre(p
′)). Concerning Pre2,
If (M0, (M
′
i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T {(σ σ1 . . . σi 0)(σi p
′)}, then (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi(σi))
is not in Mi and M′i, νi(σi) |= p
′. By definition, Pre(νi(σi)) = Pre(p
′). There are
two cases: either wi−1 = (ν(σ), ν1(σ1), . . . , νi−1(σi−1)) is not in Mi−1, in which case
(M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi−1 0), or wi−1 is in Mi−1, and Mi−1, wi−1 6|=
Pre(νi(σi)) hence (M0, (M′i)1≤i≤n, ν, (νi)1≤i≤n) |=T (σ σ1 . . . σi−1 ¬Pre(p
′)).
Rules Pre0 and Excl are sound since their numerator is never interpretable.
Proposition 4 (Tableau method completeness) For all ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L, for all
ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n ∈ L
′, ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn n
1
ψ implies ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn
1 ψ.
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We prove the contrapositive. Suppose there is a tableau for (ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1, ϕn∧¬ψ, ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n)
that has an open branch. We prove that there exist a pointed L-model (M0, w0) and n pointed
L′-models (M′j , w
′
j) such that for all j, M
′
j , w
′
j |= ϕ
′
j , for all i, wi ∈ Mi and Mi, wi |= ϕi, and
Mn, wn |= ¬ψ.
Let Γf be the set of tableau terms carried by the end node of the open branch. We define
M0,M′1, . . . ,M
′
n as follows.
• Let M0 = (W,R, V ) with W = {wσ | (σ ψ) ∈ Γf}, R(a) = {(wσ, wσ′ ) | (Ra σ σ′) ∈ Γf}
and V (p) = {wσ | (σ p) ∈ Γf}.
• Let M′i = (W
′
i , R
′
i, V
′
i ) with W
′
i = {w
′
σi
| (σi ϕ′) ∈ Γf}, R′i(a) = {(w
′
σi
, w′σ′
i
) | (Ria σi σ
′
i) ∈
Γf} and
V ′i (p
′) =
{
{w′σi | (σi p
′) ∈ Γf} if p′ ∈ Γ0
{w′σi | (σi p
′) ∈ Γf and (σi p′′) /∈ Γf for all p′′ 6= p′} otherwise.
Notice that each event model M′i verifies the Exclusivity condition: by saturation of rule
Excl, there can not be p′ and p′′ in Γ0 in the same event otherwise the branch would be closed,
and the fresh p′+ assigned to an event label σi at its creation is kept in w
′
σi
only if there is no
other atomic event in this event. So for every event w′σi , there is exactly one atomic event p
′
such that w′σi ∈ V
′
i (p
′).
Finally, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we define Mi as M0 ⊗M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i. Lemmas 5 and 6 below
establish the completeness of our tableau method.
Lemma 5 Let ϕ ∈ L and ϕ′ ∈ L′ such that ϕ′ not a fresh atomic event. If (σ ϕ) ∈ Γf then
M0, wσ |= ϕ, and if (σi ϕ′) ∈ Γf , then M′i, w
′
σi
|= ϕ′.
Proof We only prove it for M0, it is similar for M′i. The proof is done by induction on ϕ.
p,¬p: by definition of M0, wσ ∈ V (p) if and only if (σ p) ∈ Γf . So if (σ p) ∈ Γf , M0, wσ |= p,
and if (σ ¬p) ∈ Γf , we have that (σ p) /∈ Γf (otherwise the branch would be closed by
saturation of rule ⊥), hence M0, wσ |= ¬p. As for the case ϕ ∧ ψ, by saturation of rule ∧,
Γf also contains (σ ϕ) and (σ ψ). By induction hypothesis we have that M0, wσ |= ϕ and
M0, wσ |= ψ, so M0, wσ |= ϕ ∧ ψ. The cases ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) and ¬¬ϕ are proved similarly.
〈Ba〉ϕ: By saturation of rule 〈Ba〉 (with Σ of the form σ), there exists σ′ such that (Ra σ σ′) ∈
Γf and (σ′ ϕ) ∈ Γf . By induction hypothesis M0, wσ′ |= ϕ, and wσRawσ′ holds by
construction of M0, so M0, wσ |= 〈Ba〉ϕ.
Baϕ: Take some wσ′ in W0 such that wσRawσ′ holds, we prove thatM0, wσ′ |= ϕ and conclude
that M0, wσ |= Baϕ. Since wσRawσ′ holds we know by construction of M that (Ra σ σ′)
is in Γf . So by saturation of rule Ba, (σ
′ ϕ) also belongs to Γf , and by induction hypothesis
M0, wσ′ |= ϕ.
Lemma 6 Let ϕ ∈ L. For all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n, if (σ σ1 . . . σi ϕ) ∈ Γf , then wi =
(wσ , w
′
σ1
, . . . , w′σi) ∈ Mi and Mi, wi |= ϕ. If (σ σ1 . . . σi 0) ∈ Γ
f , then wi /∈ Mi.
Proof We prove it by double induction on i and ϕ′.
For i = 0: if ϕ ∈ L, the result holds by Lemma 5. If ϕ = 0, (σ 0) ∈ Γf , hence by saturation
of rule Pre0, the branch is closed. Contradiction.
Now assume that the result holds for i < n, we prove it for i+ 1.
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We write wi = (wσ , w
′
σ1
, . . . , w′σi), wi+1 = (wσ, w
′
σ1
, . . . , w′σi+1) and we start with the case
where (σ σ1 . . . σi+1 0) ∈ Γf . Let p′ be the only atomic event true in event w′σi+1 . We have
(σi+1 p
′) ∈ Γf , and by saturation of Rule Pre2, we obtain two cases. If (σ σ1 . . . σi ¬Pre(p′)) ∈
Γf , then by induction hypothesis Mi, wi 6|= Pre(w′σi+1), hence wi+1 is not in Mi+1. If
(σ σ1 . . . σi 0) ∈ Γf , by induction hypothesis, wi is not in Mi, hence Mi+1, wi+1 is not
defined.
Now the case where (σ σ1 . . . σi+1 ϕ) ∈ Γf with ϕ 6= 0. We first prove that wi+1 ∈Mi+1: by
construction of M′i there is exactly one p
′ ∈ Φ′ such that w′σi+1 ∈ V
′
i+1(p
′), and (σi+1 p
′) ∈ Γf .
By saturation of Rule Pre1, (σ σ1 . . . σi Pre(p
′)) is in Γf , and by induction hypothesis, wi ∈Mi
and Mi, wi |= Pre(p′). Since Pre(w′σi+1 ) = Pre(p
′), we have that Mi, wi |= Pre(w′σi+1 ), hence
wi+1 is in Mi+1.
We prove that Mi+1, wi+1 |= ϕ.
p,¬p: By saturation of Rule ←1, (σ p) ∈ Γf , and so M0, wσ |= p by Lemma 5. Since wi+1 ∈
Mi+1, Mi+1, wi+1 |= p by definition of the product update. The proof for ¬p is similar to
the case of p. The proof of the other boolean cases ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) and ¬¬ϕ is obtained
by applying straightforwardly the Induction Hypothesis.
〈Ba〉ϕ: If (σ σ1 . . . σi+1 〈Ba〉ϕ) ∈ Γf , then by saturation of Rule 〈Ba〉,
(Ra σ σ
+), (R1a σ1 σ
+
1 ), . . . , (R
i
a σi+1 σ
+
i+1), (σ
+ σ+1 . . . σ
+
i+1 ϕ) and
(σ+1 p
′+
1 ), . . . , (σ
+
i+1 p
′+
i+1) are in Γ
f . Let ui+1 = (wσ+ , w
′
σ+
1
, . . . , w′
σ+
i+1
). Since
(σ+ σ+1 . . . σ
+
i+1 ϕ) is in Γ
f , by induction hypothesis, ui+1 is in Mi+1 and Mi+1, ui+1 |=
ϕ. By construction of M0 and M′j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i + 1, we have wσRawσ+ ,
w′σ1R
1
aw
′
σ+
1
, . . . , w′σi+1R
i+1
a w
′
σ+
i+1
, so wi+1R
i+1
a ui+1, hence the result.
Baϕ: If (σ σ1 . . . σi+1 Baϕ) ∈ Γ
f , take ui+1 = (wσ′ , w
′
σ′
1
, . . . , w′σ′
i+1
) in Mi+1 such that
wi+1R
i+1
a ui+1, we prove that Mi+1, ui+1 |= ϕ. By definition of the product and of the
models M0 and M′1, . . . ,M
′
i+1, we have that (Ra σ σ
′), (R1a σi σ
′
i), . . . , (R
i
a σi σ
′
i) are in
Γf . By saturation of Rule Ba, whether (σ
′ σ′1 . . . σ
′
i+1 ϕ) is in Γ
f in which case we conclude
by induction hypothesis, or (σ′ σ′1 . . . σ
′
i+1 0) is in Γ
f and by induction hypothesis ui+1 is
not in Mi+1, which is a contradiction.
4 NEXPTIME-completeness and implementation
The NEXPTIME-completeness of our simple DEL-sequents [3] extends to generalized DEL-
sequents.
Proposition 7 The satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-complete
Lemma 8 The satisfiability problem is in NEXPTIME.
Proof The tableau rules presented in Subsection 3.2 give rise to a non-deterministic algorithm
running in exponential time. The algorithm starts with the following set of tableau formulas
Γ0 = {(σ ϕ0), (σ σ01 ϕ1), . . . , (σ σ
0
1 . . . σ
0
n ϕn), (σ
0
1 ϕ
′
1), . . . , (σ
0
n ϕ
′
n)} ∪
{(σ01 p
′+
1 ), . . . , (σ
0
n p
′+
n )}
Inria
Generalized DEL-sequents 13
where the p′+1 , . . . p
′+
n are fresh new atomic events.
Let δ(.) be the function that gives the modal depth of a given formula. Let maxpre be
the maximum of δ(Pre(p′)) where p′ ranges over the propositions appearing in the formulas
ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n.
Let (∆Wi)i∈{0,...,n} be defined as follows:
• ∆Wn = δ(ϕn)
• ∆Wi = max(δ(ϕ
′
i) +maxpre, δ(ϕi)) if 0 < i < n
• ∆W0 = max(δ(ϕ
′
i) +maxpre, δ(ϕi),∆W1, . . . ,∆Wn).
The algorithm runs as follows. Let N = ∆W0. For t = 0 to N , we execute:
1. Γt
′
:= the saturation of Γt by rules ∧,¬∧,¬,⊥, Excl,←1,←2,Pre1,Pre2;
2. If ⊥ ∈ Γt
′
, we stop the current execution;
3. Γt+1 := the set of tableau terms obtained by applying 〈Ba〉, Ba on Γt
′
.
Step 1 is non-deterministic and corresponds to a Boolean saturation of labels of depth i. It
non-deterministically runs in linear size of Γi. Step 2 consists in checking if rule ⊥ has been
executed. In this case, the current execution halts.
Remark that the term of the modal depth of ϕ′ in terms of the form (σi ϕ
′) is strictly
decreasing when we apply rule 〈Ba〉 and Ba. So when t > δ(ϕ′i), the set Γ
t will not contain any
terms of the form (σi ϕ
′).
Let us prove by induction that for all i we have the following property P (i): for all t > ∆Wi,
the set Γt will not contain any term of the form (σ σ1 . . . σi ψ).
Let us begin with the basic case: i = n. Note that the maximal depth of formulas ψ in
tableau terms corresponding to the last product model, that is, the modal depth of ψ in terms
of the form (σ σ1 . . . σn ψ) in Γ
t is strictly decreasing with t (see rule 〈Ba〉 and Ba). So when
t > ∆Wn, there is no more tableau formula of the form (σ σ1 . . . σn ψ) in Γ
t where ψ is a
formula or 0. So when t > δ(ϕ), the rules Pre2, 〈Ba〉 and Ba will no more be applied to terms
of the form (σ σ1 . . . σn ψ). So P (n) is true.
Now suppose P (i + 1) and let us prove P (i). Suppose there exists t > ∆Wi such that Γ
t
contains a term of the form (σ σ1 . . . σi ψ). As the modal depth decreases at each step, if ψ is
a subformula of ϕi, we have t ≤ δ(ϕi). Also by definition of ∆Wi, we have δ(ϕi) ≤ ∆Wi. This
leads to a contradiction with t > ∆Wi. So the formula ψ is either a subformula of a (possibility
negated) precondition added from rule Pre1 or Pre2 (1) or is a literal from ←1 or ←2 (2).
In the case (1), it implies that t ≤ ∆Wi + 1 +maxpre. There is a contradiction. In the case
(2), it implies that t ≤ ∆Wi for all i > 0. There is a contradiction.
That is why we have ΓN+1 = ∅ and the algorithm has applied rules until saturation, that
is, the set of tableau formulas
⋃N
t=0 Γ
t is saturated. Now let us have a look at the time re-
quired to execute the algorithm. Let x be the size of the input, that is the sum of the sizes of
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ϕ
′
1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕ and the function Pre. Step 1 saturates the nodes σ, σi and (σ σ1 . . . σi)
appearing in the tableau formulas in Γt. For each of those worlds, the saturation is linear in
x. Step 3 creates new tableau terms for each 〈Ba〉-formula appearing in Γt
′
: more precisely
each 〈Ba〉-formula creates at most n-new labels σ+, σ
+
1 , . . . , σ
+
n . So for each world in Γ
t it
produces at most x worlds in the initial model, x worlds in each i-th event model, x worlds in
the i-th product model, that is to say it produces at most (2x)n new worlds. If we note yt the
maximal number of worlds in Γt, we have that yt+1 = (2x)
nyt. So yt = (2x)
nt. Now, remark
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that N = max(max(δ(ϕ′1), . . . , δ(ϕ
′
n)) +maxpre, δ(ϕ0), . . . , δ(ϕn)) ≤ x.The total number of cre-
ated worlds is bounded by ΣNt=0yt ≤ Σ
x
t=0(2x)
nt ≤ (2x)n(x+1) and this construction takes an
exponential amount of time.
Lemma 9 The satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-hard.
Proof The satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-hard because we can encode in it the satisfi-
ability problem of a syntactic fragment. This syntactic fragment is studied in the proof of the
Proposition 4.2 in [3] and we summarize here the result in the following fact.
Claim 1 The following problem
• input: ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ L and ϕ′1 ∈ L such that:
– there is only one agent a occurring in ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1;
– ϕ1 is of the form ψ1 ∧
∧i≤δ(ϕ′1)
i=1 B
i
ap
′ where ψ1 does not contain any atomic event;
– Pre(p′) = >.
• output: yes iff ϕ0, ϕ
′
1,> 1
1
ϕ1 does not hold.
is NEXPTIME-hard.
An implementation of the tableau method can be found at the following webpage:
http://www.irisa.fr/prive/fschwarz/lotrecscheme/.
The tableau rules are written in LotrecScheme [16] which is a term rewriting system designed
for implementing tableau methods. The corresponding rules can be found directly in the software
by clicking ‘open’ and ‘generalized DEL-sequents’.
The implemented rules are similar to those presented in Subsection 3.2. There are two main
differences. The first one is that we tag worlds with ok and ¬ok to say respectively that the
node belongs to the model or not. We use those two tags for a reason of efficiency. The second
difference concerns the pattern-matching of a condition of a rule: as LotrecScheme does not
enable an arbitrary number of terms to match in a condition, we adapt the method so that the
numbers of terms in all rules are fixed. For instance, let us consider the rule Ba. (Ra Σ Σ
′) is a
macro to denote an arbitrary number of terms whereas in the implementation (Ra Σ Σ
′) is not a
macro but a term and we have to simulate the way relations are defined in the product update:
(Ra Σ Σ
′)(Ra a b)(Σ :: a ok)
(Ra Σ :: a Σ
′ :: b) and
(Ra Σ :: a Σ
′ :: b)
(Ra Σ Σ
′)(Ra a b)
where a, b, Σ and Σ′ are terms, and where Σ :: a is the concatenation of Σ and a, and Σ′ :: b is the
concatenation of Σ′ and b. Σ and Σ′ are sequences of labels, and a and b are labels representing
worlds of an event model.
5 Extension to other semantics
In this section, we investigate the complexity of the satisfiability problem with semantics where
the accessibility relations are also assumed to be reflexive or serial (an accessibility relation Ra
is reflexive when for all w ∈W , w ∈ Ra(w), and serial when for all w ∈W , there is u ∈ W such
that u ∈ Ra(w)).
For reflexivity, we add the following rule to the tableau method:
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(Σ ϕ)
(Ra Σ Σ)
T
where Σ can be σ or σi (reflexivity of product models stems from initial and event models being
reflexive). This rule is sound and complete with respect to reflexive models.
For seriality, we add the following rule to the tableau method:
(Σ Baϕ)
(Ra Σ Σ
+)(Σ+ ϕ)
D
where Σ can be σ, σi or σ σ1 . . . σi. This rule is sound and complete with respect to serial
models. There is no problem of termination because we add a successor to a node if, and only if
there is a modal formula in it.
Proposition 10 The satisfiability problem when the relations are reflexive or serial is
NEXPTIME-complete.
For the membership, it suffices to notice that adding the rule for reflexivity of seriality to the
tableau method does not modify the proof of NEXPTIME membership 8.
For the lower-bound, we reduce the satisfiability problem given in the proof of Lemma 9
to the satisfiability problems when the relations are reflexive and when the relations are serial.
Given new fresh atomic propositions p0, p1, . . . , let us consider the two following translations:
trk(p) = p tr
′
k(p
′) = p′k
trk(⊥) = ⊥ tr′k(⊥) = ⊥
trk(Bjψ) = Bj(pk+1 → trk+1(ψ)) tr′k(Bjψ) = Bj(p
′
k+1 → trk+1(ψ))
where Pre(p′k) = pk for all k.
We define tr(ϕ) = p0 ∧ tr0(ϕ) and tr′(ϕ′) = p′0 ∧ tr
′
0(ϕ
′). The three following statements are
equivalent:
1. ϕ0, ϕ
′, ϕ1 is satisfiable
2. tr(ϕ0), tr
′(ϕ′), tr(ϕ1) is satisfiable in reflexive models
3. tr(ϕ0), tr
′(ϕ′), tr(ϕ1) is satisfiable in serial models.
(i) → (ii): If ϕ0, ϕ′, ϕ1 is satisfiable, then ϕ0, ϕ′, ϕ1 is satisfiable in models that are trees
(indeed, the tableau method is sound and complete and the corresponding models are trees).
So there exists a tree-model M = (W,R, V ), a world w ∈ W , and a tree event model M′ =
(W ′, R′∗, V ′) and an event w′ ∈W ′ such that M, w |= ϕ0, M′, w′ |= ϕ′ and M⊗M′, (w,w′) |=
ϕ1. We add reflexive edges at each worlds in M and M′. We also extend the valuations so
that pk is true in a world u of M iff the depth of u in the tree-model M is equal to k. Let
M∗ = (W ∗, R∗, V ∗) and M′∗ = (W ′∗, R′∗, V ′∗) be the resulting models. We have:
• Ra = Ra
∗ ∩ {(u, v) | for all k, if u ∈ V (pk) then u ∈ V (pk+1) }
• and R′ = R′∗ ∩ {(u′, v′) | for all k, if u′ ∈ V ′(p′k) then v
′ ∈ V ′(p′k+1) }.
We have M∗, w |= tr(ϕ0), M′∗, w′ |= tr′(ϕ′) and M∗ ⊗M′∗, (w,w′) |= tr(ϕ1).
(ii) → (iii): This direction is trivial.
(iii) → (i): Suppose that there exist a serial epistemic model M∗ = (W,R∗, V ), w ∈ W , a
serial event model M′∗ = (W ′, R′∗, V ′) and w′ ∈ W ′ such that M∗, w |= tr(ϕ0), M′∗, w′ |=
tr′(ϕ′), M∗⊗M′∗, (w,w′) |= tr(ϕ1) andM
∗⊗M′∗ is serial. We define the following new model
M = (W,R, V ) in the following way:
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• Ra := Ra
∗ ∩ {(u, v) | for all k, if u ∈ V (pk) then ∈ V (pk+1) }.
and M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) in the following way:
• R′ := R′∗ ∩ {(u′, v′) | for all k, if u′ ∈ V ′(p′k) then v
′ ∈ V ′(p′k+1) }.
We have M, w |= ϕ0, M
′, w′ |= ϕ′ and M⊗M′, (w,w′) |= ϕ1.
6 Example: coordinated attack problem
In this section, we assume that there are only two agents a and b. We extend our epistemic
language L with the common knowledge operator Ca,bϕ. The truth conditions of the common
knowledge operator are defined as follows:
M, w |= Ca,bϕ iff for all v ∈ (Ra ∪Rb)
+
(w), M, v |= ϕ,
where (Ra ∪Rb)
+ is the transitive closure of (Ra ∪Rb).
Intuitively, Ca,bϕ is an abbreviation of an infinite conjunction (see [13] for more details):
Ca,bϕ = Ea,bϕ ∧ E2a,bϕ ∧ E
3
a,bϕ ∧ . . ., where E
k
a,bϕ is defined inductively as follows: E
1
a,bϕ =
Baϕ∧Bbϕ and E
k+1
a,b ϕ = BaE
kϕ ∧BbEkϕ. The definitions of DEL-sequents of Definition 1 can
easily be adapted to this extended language with common knowledge.
The coordinated attack problem from the distributed systems folklore can be described infor-
mally as follows. Two generals need to attack their common enemy simultaneously if they want
to win. However, their only way to communicate is by means of a messenger, and this messenger
may be captured at any time between the two camps. If we assume that the messenger is really
lucky and never gets caught on that particular night, how long will it take for the generals to
coordinate an attack?
We can model this problem within our framework. Assume that general a has decided to
attack at dawn. General a then sends a messenger to general b to inform him of his decision. The
content of the first message sent by general a to general b is represented by the propositional letter
attack standing for ‘general a has decided to attack at dawn’. This message eventually reaches
general b, but general a does not know it yet. This event is represented by an atomic event p′1
standing for ‘general b receives the decision of general a to attack at dawn’. Its precondition is
Pre(p′1) = attack. The only information we have about this event p
′
1 is that general b knows about
its occurrence: Bbp
′
1. As a result of this event, general b now knows that general a has decided
to attack: Bbattack. However, general a does not know it, so they still cannot coordinate a
simultaneous attack. Therefore, general b sends an acknowledgement to general a. This message
eventually reaches general a. This event is represented by the atomic event p′2 standing for
‘general a receives the first acknowledgement of general b’. The precondition of atomic event p′2
is Pre(p′2) = Bbattack. This time, general b does not know that his message has been delivered.
Therefore, the only information we have about this event p′2 is that general a knows about its
occurrence: Bap
′
2. As a result of this event, general a now knows that general b knows that
general a has decided to attack: BaBbattack. However, there is still no common knowledge that
general a has decided to attack. This informal reasoning could go on indefinitely. It shows that
common knowledge that general a has decided to attack cannot be attained.
The above informal reasoning can be formalized within our framework in a natural way.
To achieve this aim, we define for all k ∈ N∗ the atomic event p′k whose precondition is
Pre(p′k) = BaBb . . . BaBbattack if k is odd and Pre(p
′
k) = BbBaBb . . . BaBbattack if k is even
(k − 1 knowledge operators are nested alternatively in Pre(p′k)). The statement that after any
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finite number of messages exchanged, it is impossible to infer that there is common knowledge
that general a has decided to attack is formalized by the fact that, for all k ∈ N∗:
Baattack,Bbp
′
1,>, Bap
′
2, . . . , Bap
′
k−1,>, Bbp
′
k,> 6 k
1
Ca,battack if k is odd
Baattack,Bbp
′
1,>, Bap
′
2, . . . , Bbp
′
k−1,>, Bap
′
k,> 6 k
1
Ca,battack if k is even
This result is itself due to the following fact:
Proposition 11 For all k ∈ N∗,
Baattack,Bbp
′
1,>, Bap
′
2, . . . , Bbp
′
k,> 6 k
1
Ek+1a,b attack if k is odd
Baattack,Bbp
′
1,>, Bap
′
2, . . . , Bap
′
k,> 6 k
1
Ek+1a,b attack if k is even
Proof To prove the result of the coordinated attack problem, we define the following epistemic
model M = (W,R, V ) by:
• W = {w, u};
• Ra = {(w,w), (u, u)}; Rb = {(w,w), (w, u), (u, u)};
• V (attack) = {w}.
We define the following event models M′k = (W ′k, R′k, V ′k) for all k ∈ N. In the DEL litera-
ture, these event models represent private announcements. If k is even, (M′k, w′k) represents the
private announcement to general a that BbBaBb . . . BaBbattack holds, and if k is odd, (M′k, w′k)
represents the private announcement to general b that BaBb . . . BaBbattack holds.
• W ′k = {w′k, u′k};
• R′ka = {(w
′k, w′k), (u′k, u′k)}; R′kb = {(w
′k, w′k), (w′k, u′k), (u′k, u′k)} if k is even;
• R′kb = {(w
′k, w′k), (u′k, u′k)}; R′ka = {(w
′k, w′k), (w′k, u′k), (u′k, u′k)} if k is odd;
• V ′k(p′k) = {w
′k}.
• V ′k(p′) = {u′k} where Pre(p′) = >.
We then have that M, w |= Baattack, M′1, w′1 |= Bbp′1, M
′2, w′2 |= Bap′2, . . . , M
′k, w′k |=
Bbp
′
k and (M, w) ⊗ (M
′1, w′1)⊗ . . . (M′k, w′k) |= 〈Bb〉 . . . 〈Ba〉〈Bb〉¬attack.
We illustrate our tableau method by proving this fact for k = 1 in Figure 1. Remark that
E2a,battack = Ba(Baattack∧Bbattack)∧Bb(Baattack∧Bbattack). Also, we only show one branch
of the full tableau, the one which is open.
7 Conclusion
7.1 Related work
In [12], Dupin de Saint-Cyr and Lang define an operator of “extrapolation”. This operator
takes as input a temporal formula, which corresponds to a sequence of observations under the
form of propositional formulas indexed by time stamps, and yields as output another temporal
formula, which corresponds semantically to the preferred sequences of states which satisfy the
input temporal formula. The authors follow an internal approach. In [9], Booth and Nittka
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Γ0 = {(σ Baattack), (σ1 Bbp′1), (σ1 p
′+
1 ), (σ σ1 ¬E
2
a,b)}
Pre1 and ¬∧
Γ1 = Γ0 ∪ {(σ p
+
1 )} ∪ {(σ σ1 〈Ba〉¬(Baattack ∧Bbattack))}
〈Ba〉
Γ2 = Γ1 ∪ {(Ra σ σ′), (R1a σ1 σ
′
1), (σ
′ σ′1 ¬(Baattack ∧Bbattack)), (σ
′
1 p
′+
2 )}
Pre1, Ba and ¬∧
Γ3 = Γ2 ∪ {(σ′ p
+
2 )} ∪ {(σ
′ attack)} ∪ {(σ′ σ′1 〈Bb〉¬attack)}
〈Bb〉
Γ4 = Γ3 ∪ {(Rb σ′ σ′′), (R1b σ
′
1 σ
′′
1 ), (σ
′′ σ′′1 ¬attack)), (σ
′′
1 p
′+
3 )}
Pre1 and ←1
Γ5 = Γ4 ∪ {(σ′′ p
+
3 )} ∪ {(σ ¬attack)}
Figure 1: Open branch of the tableau proving that Baattack,Bbp
′
1,> 6 1
1
E2a,battack
address a similar problem but with an imperfect external approach (see [1] for more details on
the different modeling approaches). They are interested in inferring what the agent believed (or
will believe) at a given moment, based on a sequence of observations consisting of responses that
the agent has given to a sequence of belief revision inputs. Both papers deal with situations
involving a single agent. Our approach is different from both approaches, because we do not
strive to “extrapolate” new information from existing observations by resorting to an argument
of minimal change. Instead, we are only interested in inferring some necessary property that
follows from these existing observations.
Some tableau methods have been proposed for DEL, but only for public announcement logic
[4, 11] and hybrid public anouncement logic [14]. A terminating tableau method has also been
proposed for the full BMS framework in [14] by encoding the reduction axioms as tableau rules.
However, none of these tableau methods can somehow address the two problems raised in the
introduction, because the BMS language of [6] does not allow for partial and incomplete descrip-
tions of events: an event model or a formula announced publicly specifies completely how all
the agents perceive the occurrence of the corresponding event. In particular, it is impossible to
model the coordinated attack problem.
In [5], a sequent calculus has been developed, yet in an algebraic setting, making a systematic
comparison difficult. Their sequentsm1, . . . , q1, . . . , A1, . . . ,mk, . . . , ql, . . . , An ` δ are arbitrarily
long and consist of different types of formulas which can contain propositions m1, . . . ,mk, events
q1, . . . , ql and agents A1, . . . , An, and which resolve into a single proposition or event δ. A
sequent calculus has also been proposed for public announcement logic [15] which, alike our
tableau terms, refers explicitely to possible worlds and relations.
7.2 Concluding remarks
As we said in the previous subsection, our tableau method can infer necessary information which
was somehow already encoded in the sequence. In fact, our method allows us to verify in a
complexity-optimal way that a piece of information about a sequence of events does follow from
this sequence. It also allows us to check that a given epistemic plan (viewed as a sequence of
event properties) yields an epistemic goal. Even if it does not provide an algorithm to synthesize
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it ([2] deals more with synthesis), it can still be instrumental in finding out some of its necessary
properties. It can also be used during the design of the epistemic plan itself to check that we are
designing it in the ‘right’ direction.
As the title of this paper suggests, we have generalized our previous work [3] to arbitrary long
sequences of events, and extended it to the case of reflexive or serial models. Also we illustrate
our method by encoding the coordinated attack problem. However, other generalizations still
need to be done, such as the addition of a common knowledge operator in the language (as
illustrated in Section 6) and the integration of ontic events.
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